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International Organizations, NGOs, and Police Implementation of Domestic Violence 
Policies in Liberia and Nicaragua1 
 
Peace A. Medie, University of Ghana 
Shannon Drysdale Walsh, University of Minnesota 
 
Abstract 
Domestic violence is the predominant form of violence against women in most countries in 
Africa and Latin America. Scholars have theorized the adoption of domestic violence laws 
and policies in both regions. However, policy implementation is understudied and under-
theorized. Therefore, we compare how external actors — international and women’s 
organizations— have influenced police officers’ implementation of domestic violence 
policies in Liberia and Nicaragua. We propose the Transnational Implementation Process 
(TIP) to describe how external actors have employed training, institutional and policy 
restructuring, and monitoring, to influence police behavior at the street-level. The effects of 
these strategies have been conditional on the political environment. We identify two patterns 
of external influence on street-level implementation: internationally-led and domestically-
supported implementation in Liberia, with domestically-led and internationally-supported 
implementation in Nicaragua. 
Introduction 
Transnational activism by women’s organizations placed violence against women (VAW) on 
the agenda of the UN and other international organizations (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Walsh 
2016b). Since then, global, regional, and sub-regional organizations have mainstreamed 
VAW into their programming and have influenced states to develop laws, policies, 
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institutions, and programs to address domestic violence and other forms of VAW.1 They have 
also built the capacity of women’s organizations and supported them with funds to develop 
and implement a variety of programs in this area.  
Women’s organizations and international organizations have argued that these 
initiatives are necessary because the police have typically failed to deal adequately with 
domestic violence (Jubb et al. 2008, Jubb et al. 2010). Studies from across the globe show 
that despite major improvements in some countries, the police have tended to trivialize 
domestic violence and to exhibit many of the gender biases found in the wider society (UN 
General Assembly 2012; UN Women 2011). In Africa and Latin America, this has often 
resulted in a failure to record women’s complaints and to investigate or arrest the accused. 
These biases have also led to police re-victimization of women who have been battered 
(Medie 2019; Walsh and Menjívar 2016, Walsh 2016a). This re-victimization has severe 
physical and psycho-social implications for women. It often results in women returning to the 
same abuse from which they sought protection. Additionally, the lack of appropriate policing 
further empowers abusers who realize they will not be held accountable, leaving survivors 
more vulnerable to retaliation and heightened violence. In Central America, systemic policing 
failures have also caused women to flee and seek asylum elsewhere, even though many are 
then deported back to the home countries that failed to protect them in the first place 
(Menjívar and Walsh 2017).  
Consequently, the United Nations and women’s organizations, through international 
instruments such as the Declaration of Violence against Women (DEVAW), have sought to 
promote new domestic violence norms. They have advocated for the adoption of domestic 
violence laws and policies, and for the creation of specialized institutions and programs, 
which are meant to correct weaknesses in police responses to female victims. Subsequently, 
legal and institutional measures have been adopted in most countries throughout Africa and 
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Latin America. However, with a few exceptions, the gender and politics literature is mostly 
silent on how these international and domestic actors have affected street-level behavior of 
the police in these settings. Street-level bureaucrats, such as police officers, are civil servants 
that have direct contact with the general public. They function as policy decision-makers. 
Policies are not static, but rather are continually being made through agency regulations and 
street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky 1980). These powerful political agents have the latitude to 
make decisions that impact implementation, and their street-level behavior can enforce or 
undermine written policies. Thus, their near-absence from the literature constitutes a major 
knowledge gap.  
We address this gap by advancing a typology of the implementation process that 
involves external actors at the international and domestic levels. These processes differ from 
and extend upon those that have been proposed to explain policy adoption and 
implementation (Montoya 2009), and contribute to building a theoretical framework for 
explaining street-level implementation in developing countries. We draw on over 350 
interviews conducted in Liberia and Nicaragua to compare how international organizations 
and women’s organizations in both countries influenced implementation by street-level 
actors, namely police officers. We focus on two indicators of improved street-level 
performance in the implementation of VAW policies: 1) the reduction in practices that re-
victimize survivors who report domestic violence in Liberia and Nicaragua and 2) the referral 
of cases to courts in Liberia. We argue that external actors (international and women’s 
organizations) employed training, institutional and policy restructuring, and monitoring of the 
police to influence street-level policing and that their involvement was crucial for improving 
police responsiveness to domestic violence. We show how international and domestic 
organizations, through Transnational Implementation Processes (TIPs), have contributed to a 
reduction in re-victimizing practices and contributed to an increase in the rate of referral of 
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domestic violence cases for prosecution. We also demonstrate that the TIP is not linear, as 
exemplified by the recent reversal of implementation measures in Nicaragua. 
 This comparison of Liberia and Nicaragua demonstrates that there is variation in the 
relative roles and influence of international organizations vs. domestic women’s 
organizations across different contexts, but that both were key to improving police response 
to VAW in both countries. Liberia exemplifies an internationally-led and domestically-
supported transnational implementation process, involving a United Nations (UN)-led reform 
of the police force. However, Liberia’s strong women’s movement also exerted pressure on 
the government and the UN to hold perpetrators of VAW, particularly sexual violence, 
accountable. The Liberian National Police (LNP) collaborated with the UN Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL) to establish a specialized unit — the Women and Children Protection 
Section (WACPS) —of the police force.  While UNMIL and LNP were at the forefront of the 
reform process, women’s organizations also participated in the restructuring of the police 
force and in training and monitoring of police officers. Thus, Liberia is a case of an 
internationally-led and domestically-supported transnational implementation process. 
Nicaragua exemplifies a domestically-led and internationally-supported transnational 
implementation process from the 1990s through 2017, when the women’s police stations 
were constructed and operated. Domestic advocates proposed the idea of specialized policing 
for women, attracted funding from international cooperation agencies, and worked with these 
agencies and with the government to improve police responses to domestic violence. 
Domestic support from civil society has continued for women’s policing in Nicaragua, but 
the shrinking of international donor support and disappearance of state support has 
contributed to the recent decline in implementation. 
These findings advance the international relations and gender and politics literatures 
by specifying the mechanisms and pathways through which external actors, including 
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international organizations, influence street-level implementation in developing countries. 
The findings are also relevant for policy and practice. However, we are careful to note that 
profound weaknesses in police performance persist in both countries despite these 
improvements, and that advances are susceptible to reversal (Schia and de Carvalho 2009). 
For example, a lack of infrastructure and equipment in Liberia have led officers to take 
actions that undermine democratic and gender-sensitive policing (Medie 2015). Nicaragua 
recently reversed most of its advances in policing for women and is now utilizing 
government-supported security forces to arrest, torture, and even murder citizens protesting 
and opposing recent government policies (Amnesty International 2018). As of 2017, the 
women’s police stations closed due to a lack of government support and declining 
international funding (Neumann 2018, Córdoba 2018). The increasing consolidation of the 
Ortega regime that began to close itself to external influence in 2008 was an early warning 
sign of what now is a national crisis for citizen security – and completely undermined 
previous policing advances for women. 
 We also recognize that the referral of cases to court does not always result in 
prosecution and that prosecution does not guarantee a deterrence. We also recognize that 
women, including many who report domestic violence to the police, often do not seek the 
arrest and prosecution of their partners (Medie 2015; Horn et al 2015; Hossain et al 2014). 
However, the referral of cases for prosecution is an important indicator of the seriousness 
with which the state and its officials judge the problem of domestic violence and a measure 
of their enforcement of the law.  
In the next section, we review the literature on police responses to domestic violence 
in Africa and Latin America and highlight the commonalities and differences across these 
regions. We then review the scholarship on the implementation of VAW laws and explain 
that while there is an emerging literature showing that international actors shape 
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implementation, most of this work has not examined the relative roles of international vs. 
domestic actors, nor investigated their impacts on street-level behavior. We follow this with a 
discussion of the methodology and background for Liberia and Nicaragua. We then explain 
how external actors engage in transnational implementation processes that entail 
collaboration between international organizations and domestic women’s organizations. 
Through our case studies, we demonstrate how the mechanisms of training, institutional and 
policy restructuring, and monitoring influence street-level behavior.  
Police Responses to Domestic Violence 
Across Africa and Latin America, the police is one of the least trusted institutions (Gallup 
2018; Bailey and Dammert 2006; Medie 2018). While there are marked differences across 
countries, this lack of trust is widespread. While exceptions exist, policing in Africa and 
Latin America has a history of placing the protection of the political elite above protection of 
and service to everyday citizens (Alemika 2009, Cruz 2006; Osse 2014; Tankebe 2011). 
Political leaders and elites have used the police force, and its resources, to supress opponents 
in the populace and maintain their grip on power (Hills 2007). They have also diverted 
resources from responding to the populace’s calls for help and from investigating, executing 
arrests, and referring cases to court. This prioritization of elite interests is an extension of 
colonial-era policing in Africa and Latin America, during which the role of the police was to 
protect the colonial establishment from the indigenous population (Alemika 2009; Tankebe 
2013) and the landed oligarchy (Cruz 2006, Amaya 2006). In Latin America, the co-optation 
of police forces by elites was widespread during civil wars when dictatorships used police as 
agents of repression (e.g., the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua).  
 This politicization of the police is one of the reasons why policing in many countries 
falls below the standards of democratic policing (Ungar 2009). Bayley (2001) identifies four 
elements of democratic policing: police prioritization of the needs of individual citizens and 
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private groups; police accountability to the law, rather than the government in power; police 
protection of human rights; and transparency of police activities.  This politicization of the 
force, combined with corruption and ineffectiveness at enforcing the law, has also 
contributed to distrust of the institution and to the persistence of undemocratic policing in 
most African and Latin American countries (Armah-Attoh et al. 2007; Medie 2018; Fruhling 
2003). In surveys conducted in 2002 and 2005 in twelve African countries, 80% of 
respondents saw the police as the most corrupt of eleven government institutions (Armah-
Attoh et al. 2007). Inadequate training and poor remuneration, as well as the lack of 
infrastructure, logistics, and equipment, also contribute to unethical practices in the force and 
to undemocratic policing in Africa (Medie 2018) and Latin America (Macaulay 2012). Thus, 
while there are indications that some police forces perform better than others, policing in 
these two regions has largely failed to meet the needs of the majority of the population. 
Female victims of violence are particularly underserved by the institution (Menjívar and 
Walsh 2017). 
 Despite some improvements, women are underrepresented within the police forces in 
Africa and Latin America (Gaanderse and Valasek 2011, Ortega 2018). In 2011, Liberia’s 
police force was 15.42 percent women and Nicaragua’s was 26 percent women (Kerr-Wilson 
et al. 2011). Even though Nicaragua has a comparatively high proportion of female officers, 
these are still male-dominated institutions. While the presence of female officers is not 
necessary for gender-sensitive policing and is no guarantee that the interests and well-being 
of women will be prioritized, their absence is a strong indicator of a failure to recognize that 
policing is gendered and of the seriousness that is attached to VAW. Indeed, the police in 
many African countries have been found to exhibit behaviors that lead to the re-victimization 
of victims of domestic violence and other forms of VAW and to ineffectiveness in handling 
their cases (Medie 2018, Jubb et al. 2010). While most complainants in domestic violence 
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cases do not want their partners to be prosecuted, they typically want an intervention to stop 
the violence (Horn et al. 2015; Author 2015, Hautzinger 2007). They also want to be treated 
with kindness and respect. However, reports suggest that this has typically not been the case 
in most non-specialized police stations in Africa and Latin America (Medie 2018; 2015; Jubb 
et al. 2010). The police have generally not viewed domestic violence as a serious offense and 
have often failed to record and investigate reports and to refer cases to court, even when this 
is the complainants’ preference (UN General Assembly 2012; UN Women 2011). 
Furthermore, gender norms that cut across societies worldwide have tended to blame women 
for this violence. This kind of treatment by police amounts to a re-victimization of survivors. 
In addition to leaving women vulnerable to the violence, it emboldens perpetrators who know 
that they will not be held accountable by the formal justice system  
 It is in response to the weaknesses and failures of the justice system to respond 
adequately to women victims that states have passed new laws, strengthened existing ones, 
and established specialized police stations. Pressure from and collaboration with international 
organizations and women’s NGOs often led to the creation of these specialized laws and 
policing. Specialized policing has been promoted by the UN in Africa (Medie 2018; Medie 
2019). Coordination between various international donors and domestic actors has diffused 
the model of specialized policing for women within Latin America (Jubb et al. 2008). In 
Africa, these specialized police stations have proliferated in post-war states such as Liberia. 
While they hold the potential to improve how survivors will be treated by the criminal justice 
system, the literature suggests caution in viewing specialized policing as a panacea in Latin 
America (Hautzinger 2007, MacDowell Santos 2005). However, where changes have been 
made, actors external to the state have often been crucial to these advances (Jubb et al. 2008). 
It is, therefore, important to understand how efforts by external actors have influenced 
policing in the area of domestic violence. 
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Literature on the Creation and Implementation of Domestic Violence Policies 
Scholarship on states’ responses to VAW largely does not address street-level behavior, but 
does reveal that external actors are crucial for policy adoption, the creation of institutions, 
and institutional reforms. For example, Laurel Weldon’s 2002 cross-national study measures 
countries’ responsiveness — the degree and speed with which governments make seven 
advances that include legal reforms, funding for shelters and crisis centers, government 
training programs and initiatives, and the development of policy agencies and prevention 
strategies. She finds that external actors are important, as responsiveness improves with the 
presence of a strong, autonomous women’s movement that reinforces state institutions. In a 
study of post-communist countries, Olga Avdeyeva (2007) conceptualizes implementation of 
VAW laws as the ratification of and compliance with human rights treaties, such as the 
Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). 
She finds that women’s organizations and international organizations influenced 
implementation through coercion, persuasion, and acculturation. For example, women’s 
organizations in Croatia and Slovenia shamed the government into developing police training 
programs and sponsoring shelters for battered women. In Kosovo, coercive strategies 
employed by the UN mission led to policy implementation by the government.  
Celeste Montoya’s (2013) cross-national analysis of the European Union measures 
the implementation of VAW laws by the extent of institutional reforms, including advances 
in protocols, regulations, and guidelines, as well as the development of a broad range of state 
agencies, programs, regulatory practices, training programs, and public awareness 
campaigns. She argues that a lack of local commitment and/or capacity are obstacles to 
implementation, and that external actors such as international organizations can help build 
capacity and women’s networks. Montoya (2009) also notes that there are three types of 
policy reform processes: domestically-driven, transnationally-driven, and internationally-
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driven. She argues that countries are more likely to implement VAW laws where reforms are 
domestically-driven, as they have the highest levels of commitment and capacity. While 
Liberia and Nicaragua do not fit into her framework of a transnationally-driven policy reform 
process,2 they did exhibit transnational efforts to implement institutional reforms. We seek to 
understand how external actors have influenced street-level policing on domestic violence in 
Liberia and Nicaragua. Furthermore, we build on this literature by moving beyond the 
creation of institutions to study implementation at the street level.  
Methodology and Sources of Data 
We are conducting a comparative analysis of Liberia and Nicaragua to identify the processes 
by which international and domestic actors impact street-level implementation of VAW laws. 
We are leveraging these cases as heuristic case studies (George and Bennett 2005, 74) in 
order to identify relevant new causal mechanisms and causal pathways for strengthening and 
weakening implementation. This draws on the “grounded theory” approach that generates 
theoretical insights through qualitative research (Glaser 1978, Strauss and Corbin 1994, 273-
285). We engage in inductive theory-building, rather than theory-testing.  
Both authors conducted extensive field research with the objective, among others, of 
understanding the factors that have shaped police responses to domestic violence and rape.  
In Africa, the first author conducted over 150 semi-structured interviews in Monrovia and 
Gbarnga in Liberia in 2010 and 2011. This included interviews with 50 police officers, other 
officials in the police and courts, UN officials, survivors of domestic violence, and women’s 
rights advocates, some of whom worked for women’s NGOs. In Central America, the second 
author conducted over 200 semi-structured interviews in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, including over 50 in Nicaragua over the course of 22 months from 2004-2014. 
Interviewees in Nicaragua within and outside the police stations included police officers, 
social workers, psychologists, lawyers, judges, state officials, bureaucrats, survivors of 
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domestic violence, journalists, and women’s rights advocates, some of whom worked for 
domestic or international NGOs. Both authors also drew on secondary sources of data 
including newspapers and reports produced by the police and by international organizations. 
Data coding was guided by the literature. We sought to identify the explanatory variables that 
have been specified in the literature and the frequency of their occurrence in the interview 
data. However, we also sought to inductively identify explanations that are largely absent 
from the literature, as this is an area that is understudied.  
The Case Studies: Domestic Violence and the Police in Liberia and Nicaragua 
While institutional reforms are an important part of implementation, we are focusing on the 
aim of these reforms, which is for state agents working in these institutions to be more 
responsive to women. In the case of policing, we conceptualize implementation as improved 
street-level performance. Two indicators of improved performance are reduction in the re-
victimization of survivors and an increase in the rates of referral for prosecution. While we 
do not have quantitative measures of the first outcome, we draw on our interviews with 
police officers, women’s rights advocates, government officials and officials of international 
agencies, and survivors of violence to assess police performance on this indicator.  
We conceptualize the process of implementation for Liberia and Nicaragua as 
transnational, and generalizable to countries with shared characteristics. We argue that 
implementation is achieved through transnational implementation processes (TIPs) in which 
external actors (in this case, international organizations and domestic women’s organizations) 
collaboratively engage in training, restructuring institutions and policies, and monitoring 
police behavior. External actors help overcome challenges to implementation in contexts 
where capacity is lacking. Liberia had an internationally-led and domestically-supported TIP, 
whereas Nicaragua had a TIP that was domestically-led and internationally-supported – 
reversed when the Ortega government consolidated power and closed itself to external 
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influence. While external actors have been necessary for implementation, their impact has 
also been dependent on the government being open to pressure and assistance from them.   
Liberia. Domestic violence, prosecuted as simple and aggravated assault, is the most 
prevalent form of VAW in Liberia and comprises the majority of VAW cases reported to the 
police. While there is no systematic study of VAW in pre-civil war Liberia, interviews with 
women’s rights advocates suggest that this problem was prevalent in the country and rarely 
reported to the police (Medie 2012). Women’s activism drew attention to widespread sexual 
violence committed by the warring factions during the country’s 14-year (1989-2003) civil 
war (African Women and Peace Support Group 2004; Medie 2012). While domestic violence 
during Liberia’s civil war has been understudied, research from the wars in Uganda, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and elsewhere shows that domestic violence does not cease during wars (Okello and 
Hovil 2007; Hossain et al 2014). Furthermore, the end of a war does not end this violence 
that women face within the home (Medie 2015).  
 Liberia’s most recent demographic and health survey shows that 33 percent of women 
had been subjected to physical violence by their partner in the previous year (LISGIS et al 
2008). The types of violence they were subjected to include kicking, dragging, forced sex, 
and beating. About 1183 cases of domestic violence (simple and aggravated assault) were 
reported to the police in 2010 (Medie 2012). However, domestic violence in Liberia, like in 
most countries across the globe, is under-reported. A 2008- 2009 study across five of 
Liberia’s fifteen counties revealed that only one percent of domestic violence cases was 
reported to a formal authority such as the police (Isser et al., 2009).  
The majority of cases were resolved within informal institutions such as families or 
customary courts. The failure to report this offense to the police is partly influenced by 
Liberian’s distrust of the police force and by the existence of alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms. The Liberia National Police (LNP) and the courts are two of the least trusted 
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institutions in the country (Medie 2018; Wambua 2015). This is not surprising because from 
its inception, the LNP has been politicized and has failed to conform to the principles of 
democratic policing (Akpan 1973). Political leaders have also used the force to silence the 
opposition and suppress dissent (Akpan 1973). Furthermore, the LNP did not recognize 
domestic violence as a category of crime before the war. This was reflected in how 
complainants were treated. Only the most grievous incidents were referred to court and there 
was the tendency to blame women for the violence (Medie 2015).  
According to Deddeh Kwekwe, head of the Ministry of Gender and Development’s 
(MoGD’s) Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Unit (SGBV), “The police didn’t know how 
to handle sexual and gender-based violence. If someone came to report domestic violence, 
the police would say, ‘It’s your fault you were beaten.’ If a woman reported rape, the police 
would suggest she had caused it. They would make it worse, and women would be 
traumatized” (in Bacon 2012, p. 3). Given this lack of trust in the police and their 
ineffectiveness in helping victims, it is not surprising that most survivors preferred to resolve 
the case in informal dispute resolution forums.  The LNP’s Women and Children Protection 
Section (WACPS), which was created in 2005, is the first mechanism of its kind in Liberia 
and sought to address these weaknesses. Its creation coincided with advocacy by a strong 
women’s movement which pressured the transitional government to address VAW, 
particularly sexual violence, in the aftermath of the country’s civil war. We, therefore, seek to 
understand how international actors, who collaborated with the government to establish the 
specialized section and women’s organizations that called for improved police performance, 
have influenced street-level responses to domestic violence.  We ask the same question in 
Nicaragua.  
Nicaragua. Studies of Nicaragua indicate that there is widespread and persistent domestic 
violence, similar to Liberia. Leftist Sandinista revolutionaries overthrew a right-wing 
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dictatorship in 1979, followed by a decade of civil war between the revolutionary 
government and U.S.-funded “contras,” counter-revolutionaries. Sexual violence was 
widespread during the Nicaraguan civil war, though not to the extent that it was committed 
during wartime Liberia. In a 2006–2007 survey in Nicaragua, 48 percent of respondents who 
once had a partner (married or unmarried) reported that they had been a victim of verbal or 
psychological abuse (ENDESA 2006–2007). Furthermore, 27 percent reported that they had 
been subjected to physical abuse, and 13 percent reported sexual abuse by their partner or ex-
partner (ENDESA 2006–2007, 29). Other surveys in Nicaragua report even higher levels of 
VAW, with 52 percent of ever-married women reported having experienced physical partner 
abuse at some point in their lives (Ellsberg et al. 2000).  
The structure of policing has changed dramatically in Nicaragua in two periods: the 
first was the rise of the women’s police stations in the 1990s, followed by their initial decline 
in 2008 and closure in 2017. Before 1979, the police was used as a repressive apparatus of 
the state during the Somoza dictatorship (then, police were called the National Guard). After 
the 1979 Sandinista Revolution, the old Guard was replaced by new, primarily Sandinista, 
officers and restructured to focus on citizen-based policing. Even so, there were many cases 
of women reporting domestic abuse and being treated as if they deserved it. This made many 
women wary of the police providing public security.2  
In protest to police mistreatment of victims, a movement emerged to create women’s 
police stations through a domestically-led and internationally-supported transnational 
implementation process. They formed alliances with women working in the police as well as 
international cooperation agencies from the Netherlands among others, to help fund and 
create specialized policing units to respond to victims of domestic violence (Córdoba 2018). 
Female police officers worked with women’s organizations to strengthen the response to 
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domestic violence. This coalition attracted the attention of international donors by having a 
strong gender perspective on policing as well as the problem of VAW. International 
cooperation agencies collaborated with local advocates to create Nicaragua’s first women’s 
police station in 1993. In 2015, there were 162 such stations throughout the country, serving 
women and children and operated by female officers (Neumann 2018). This collaborative 
effort also strengthened street-level responses to domestic violence. The Nicaraguan WPSs 
was credited with helping the police gain legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the general 
public, as the police once placed second in an image ranking of Nicaraguan institutions 
(Bastick et al. 2007).  
However, this period of collaboration between the state and non-state actors began to 
decline in 2008, a year after Daniel Ortega returned to the presidency (Córdoba 2018). 
Women’s police stations began a de facto closure in 2009 when the Ortega government 
began to prohibit women’s organizations from accompanying victims (Córdoba 2018). In 
2014, President Ortega issued an executive order that weakened the Nicaraguan violence 
against women law (Law 779). Instead of directing victims to women’s police stations with 
integrated services, police were instructed to direct women to newly created Family Councils 
that discourage women from advancing legal cases (Córdoba 2018).  
During the period when women’s police stations still operated, there were 
deficiencies within the police and the women’s police stations – including a lack of funding 
and marginalization within the broader police force. These limitations and setbacks have been 
written about elsewhere (Walsh 2016a, Neumann 2018). The advances of the WPSs from the 
pre-women’s police station era were still vast and demonstrates the impact of external actors’ 
collaboration with the women’s police stations on victim services. However, re-victimization 
is on the rise as a result of closing down the women’s police stations in the context of the 
Ortega government closing the state to external influence and assistance. The section on 
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Nicaragua will examine the improvement during the period of women’s police stations, and 
the initial reports of failing institutional performance since their closure.  
External Involvement in the Implementation of the Assault Laws in Liberia  
Liberia exemplifies a transnational implementation process that was internationally-led and 
domestically-supported. Implementation was led by the UN, and strongly supported by the 
state and by women’s organizations. We are operationalizing implementation as the 
performance of street-level police officers, focusing specifically on the reduction in the re-
victimization of survivors and the referral of domestic violence cases to the courts. Officers 
of Liberia’s Women and Children Protection Section (WACPS) of the police force are tasked 
with receiving all forms of VAW. The WACPS was established in 2005 under a 
memorandum of understanding between the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) and 
the Liberia National Police (LNP) as response to widespread rape during and after the 
country’s civil war. The Section was created as a part of the police reform process led by the 
United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) that began in 2004. The first cohort of WACPS 
officers graduated from the police academy in 2005 and the first unit became operational in 
September 2005. Within eight months, six units had been established across the country and 
by December 2008, there was one WACPS unit in each of Liberia’s 15 counties.  
External actors, particularly the UN, played a key role in the establishment of the 
WACPS. UN officials proposed the idea to the transitional government, which was under 
pressure from the country’s strong women’s movement to strengthen the police force so that 
it could better address the widespread sexual violence that persisted after the end of the 
country’s civil war. The transitional government lacked the capacity to independently address 
the problem. The UN’s proposal as well as its support was, therefore, key to the section’s 
establishment. Some funding for the construction and renovation of police stations came from 
the Norwegian government, which funded the construction of district headquarters. However, 
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we argue that the impact of international actors is not limited to the establishment of the 
WACPS but also extends to the performance of officers in the section (Medie 2013). 
Furthermore, domestic women’s organizations also shaped how officers of the WACPS 
enforced the law on assault. These international and domestic actors have been able to 
influence street-level implementation through: 1) training, 2) institutional and policy 
restructuring, and 3) monitoring the performance of police officers.3 
Training: UNMIL led the training of WACPS officers within the police academy. In addition 
to this training, the UN and international NGOs such as the Norwegian Refugee Council also 
organized continuous development workshops in which officers were trained in how to 
address domestic violence and other forms of VAW. Women’s organizations, often with 
funding from donors, also organized training sessions for police officers. These trainings 
were important because they helped police officers to understand that survivors of domestic 
violence should be treated with care and sensitivity. A female officer explained that the 
WACPS training had taught her to be motherly towards victims of domestic violence, to 
always protect them, and to make them feel safe.3 Another female officer explained how the 
creation of the WACPS and the training changed practices in the LNP: 
So the office we were using, when victims would come, we just used to put both of 
them [accused and complainant] there, suspect looking at victim, victim looking at 
suspect, all those things happened then. Because we had only one office at that time… 
When we had not gone through the training, we would ask the victim “Is this the guy 
who did this that to you” then we would ask the suspect “Do you know this girl here, 
is that what you did to her, is what she is telling us true?” But when we went through 
the women and children protection training we learnt that the victim and suspect 
should not be in the same room while the investigation is ongoing.4  
 
This training, provided mainly by the UN and complemented by some women’s 
organizations, was reinforced by the section’s policies.  
                                                     
3 Interview, Officer #6, Monrovia, 13 October 2010. 
4 Interview, Officer #12, Monrovia, June 2011. 
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Institutional and Policy Restructuring: UNMIL led the restructuring of the police force to 
create the WACPS and along with women’s organizations, shaped the section’s policies. The 
section’s first director, Vera Manly graduated from the police academy in 2005 and created 
four squads, including a domestic violence squad, within the WACPS. Her training, and that 
of other senior officials, by UNMIL, ensured that the sections’ structure and policies were 
crafted by leaders who had been introduced to international norms on how to respond to 
domestic violence. Furthermore, UN Police (UNPOL) officers were embedded within the 
WACPS. Six UNPOL officers were stationed in the WACPS headquarters between “2005 
and 2011 to provide on-the-job training and guidance” to their Liberian counterparts (Bacon 
2012, p. 5). Their presence at the centre of the WACPS’ decision-making structure ensured 
that they offered advice that shaped the section’s domestic violence policy. Members of the 
National Gender-Based Violence Taskforce included various UN agencies and a women’s 
NGO (Association of Female Lawyers of Liberia, AFELL). Taskforce members participated 
in crafting the section’s 2009 handbook: National Standard Operating Procedures for 
Prevention and Response to Sexual and Gender Based Violence. This handbook was created 
to guide officers on how to handle cases of sexual and other forms of VAW, including 
domestic violence. The WACPS’ structure and policies, combined with the training received 
by officers, influenced police behavior (Medie 2013). They signalled to officers that there 
could be repercussions for not referring cases to court, and encouraged many of them to 
avoid the withdrawal of cases (Medie 2015).  
Monitoring: External actors also monitored performance. Liberia’s gender-based violence 
(GBV) taskforce, which was chaired by the Ministry of Gender and Development, consisted 
of NGOs and representatives of the Ministry of Justice, including the police. Taskforce 
meetings were held monthly in each county and were forums where NGOs reported on their 
programming. It was also a forum in which these organizations brought their concerns before 
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the police. They identified problems in policing within their respective communities and then 
charged the police representatives present to address these problems. Therefore, this was a 
forum where international and local organizations could demand accountability from the 
police in a mostly friendly environment. Members of staff of women’s NGOs also explained 
that they sometimes accompanied women to the police station and followed up on cases 
(Medie 2012). When they were dissatisfied with the police response, they elevated their 
concerns to the central headquarters (Medie 2013).  
UNPOL had a more systematic approach to monitoring. UNPOL officers visited 
police stations daily to review log books and to follow up on cases. Police officers 
interviewed reported that UNPOL officers generally focused on major cases such as rape and 
aggravated assault (domestic violence). They advised police officers on how to proceed with 
individual cases and monitored the progress of cases to ensure that the prescribed procedure 
was followed.  Officer #36 summarized their interaction with the UN thus: “So then they 
(UNPOL) look at those cases they recommend what we should do, they help us in the 
process…let’s say by helping us with their vehicles to do some follow up on cases.5 This 
close working relationship with the UN encouraged and compelled officers to practice 
prescribed actions, such as referring cases to court and to avoid practices that re-victimized 
women.  
Street-Level Performance: Statistics provided by the WACPS showed that while the majority 
of simple assault cases were withdrawn, the majority of aggravated assault cases were 
referred to court. In 2009, the section received 994 cases of simple assault and 189 cases of 
aggravated assault. Of these numbers, 147 simple assault cases were referred to court and 653 
withdrawn while 69 aggravated assault cases were referred to court and 56 withdrawn.4 The 
remainder of the cases were pending. This difference between the responses to simple and 
                                                     
5 Interview, Male officer, Monrovia, 7 Oct 2010. 
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aggravated assault have been explained elsewhere (Medie 2015) but the percentage of 
referrals is a marked increase from what existed before the section’s creation and before the 
civil war. While we recognize that there are limitations to using the rate of referral as a 
measure of improved performance, the referral and withdrawal of cases is a strong indicator 
of law enforcement officers’ attitudes towards a crime and of the implementation of 
international domestic violence norms.  
Interviews with staff members of women’s NGOs and UN officials also showed that 
they had perceived a reduction in re-victimizing practices. For example, a staff member of a 
woman’s NGO in Monrovia explained that with training, the practice of asking women 
questions that discouraged them from coming to the police had reduced.6 A member of staff 
of an international NGO stated that with training and coordination, the police had begun 
sending survivors who needed psychosocial support to them.7 
Overall, the UN led implementation and was supported by domestic women’s 
organizations. However, the activities of both external actors were facilitated by the political 
environment in Liberia. The section was created about two years after the end of Liberia’s 
civil war and during a period in which the UN was leading the mandated reform of the police 
force. The 14-year civil war had so devastated Liberia that the police force was practically 
non-existent and the transitional government was heavily reliant on the international 
community. This gave the UN access to the police force and its officers. Furthermore, due in 
part to pressure from international actors such as the UN and from the women’s movement, 
the government recognized that it was important to strengthen police response to sexual 
                                                     
6 Interview A, Women’s Organization 1, Monrovia, 2 February 2011. 
7 Interview B, International NGO 1, Monrovia, 12 August 2010. 
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violence and declared its commitment to addressing this problem. However, it is important to 
note that despite these improvements, the WACPS has been plagued by several problems.  
 Women’s rights activists criticized the section for being ineffective, slow, and for 
perpetrating some unethical practices, such as colluding with the perpetrators of violence 
(Medie 2012). In 2015, the commissioner of police warned officers against “compromising” 
rape cases (allAfrica, 2015). Furthermore, the section is heavily under-resourced such that 
officers with good intentions struggle to perform their duties (Medie 2012). Informal 
institutions such as gender norms that discourage women and punish them for reporting 
domestic violence also affected police performance as women often sought to withdraw cases 
after filing a complaint (Medie 2015). At the same time, activists acknowledged that police 
performance had improved in comparison to the pre-war period (Medie 2012). The case 
study exemplifies an internationally driven but domestically-supported implementation 
process.  
External Involvement in the Implementation of the Domestic Violence Law in 
Nicaragua  
Nicaragua exemplifies a transnational implementation process that was a domestically-led 
and externally-supported during the period of creation and operation of the women’s police 
stations. The subsequent period that led to the closure of the women’s police stations and 
weakening of implementation was preceded by the loss of domestic support within the state, 
a state that increasingly excluded domestic women’s organizations and international 
organizations from involvement in policy making and implementation, and the decline of 
external support by international donors.  
Women’s Police Stations in Nicaragua were initially established as a direct result of 
advocacy networks at the local and international level trying to improve police performance 
after systematic police failures to respond appropriately to cases of domestic violence. Within 
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the police, female officers allied with local women’s movement activists and their 
collaborative approach attracted the attention of international donors, which provided funding 
and other support. For example, international cooperation agencies provided airline tickets 
for local women’s advocates to visit and observe police stations in South America, which 
later became institutional models for the first women’s police stations in Nicaragua. Actors 
external to the state were also crucial for advancing the implementation of VAW laws 
through their involvement in training, shaping the institutional structure and policies within 
the police, and monitoring police performance. These efforts were more domestically-led in 
Nicaragua than in Liberia.  
As in Liberia, external actors were also key to the 1993 establishment and subsequent 
expansion of the women’s police stations. However, it was local women’s movement 
advocates working with women police officers and female state functionaries that 
spearheaded these efforts, which were supported by international cooperation agencies. A 
Nicaraguan police officer notes that “We had the opportunity to create the women’s police 
stations because there were women in the Supreme Court, in Congress, working as forensic 
specialists, and in the army. Many of them came from the women’s movement.”8  
The Dutch Embassy initially provided funding to make the women’s police stations 
possible, in spite of initial resistance especially from male state functionaries within and 
outside of the police (Jubb 2010, Walsh 2016a). Later, international cooperation agencies 
from Spain, Denmark, and the Netherlands, among others, provided a broad range of 
resources essential to maintaining and improving the performance of women’s policing units. 
Resources from international sources have included funding for training, anti-violence 
campaigns, community meetings, and police vehicles.9  
                                                     
8 Anonymous interview. Interview by author. Managua, Nicaragua. March 6, 2008.  
9 Anonymous interviews with a police officer on March 12, 2008 and a worker with an international 
cooperation agency on March 31, 2008 in Managua, Nicaragua.  
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The nature of external actor involvement in policing has changed over time in 
Nicaragua. The first stages of external involvement in Nicaragua was transnational, as local 
grassroots efforts leveraged international donor support. Shortly after the creation of the first 
women’s police stations in 1993, local women’s organizations and the National Institute of 
Women worked on large-scale projects with international cooperation agencies, which 
provided technical assistance for the development of women’s police stations. These projects 
ran through the 1990s until the end of their funding cycle in 2004. In general, the drive 
behind many international donor projects in Latin America has been to provide seed funding 
and technical assistance for incipient state institutions, in order for the state to later adopt 
responsibility for operations and institutional continuity.  
After 2004, international cooperation agencies remained involved in ad hoc projects 
with the police, but not on the comprehensive scale that took place before 2004. By 2013, as 
the Latin American economy began to improve, international cooperation agencies scaled 
back operations or stopped working in Central American countries altogether. Many agencies 
shifted their focus toward projects to less developed countries (especially within Africa).10 
Due to the withdrawal of international cooperation agencies, external actors at the 
international and domestic level now have less of an influence on policing than in the past.  
The waning of international involvement has left Nicaraguan women’s movement 
advocates vulnerable to the political vagaries of the state. In 2014, the Ortega administration 
reformed and weakened the 2012 VAW law, and closed the WPSs in 2017 (Neumann 2018, 
Córdoba 2018). While these closures have not been officially decreed, domestic abuse cases 
are now routed to the Judicial Assistance Directorate of the National Police, a unit that lacks 
gender training (Córdoba 2018). In addition, the Nicaraguan government began violently 
                                                     
10 Anonymous interview with an individual working for an international donor agency. Phone interview on 
November 10, 2013. Managua, Nicaragua.  
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repressing protests against social security system reforms in April 2018. This has escalated 
into a national crisis, with a reported 322 people killed including 22 police officers – mostly 
at the hands of state agents – and 2000 injured as of September 18, 2018 (Amnesty 
International 2018). 
Thus, in the description below for the impact of external actors on training, shaping 
institutional rules, and monitoring, we differentiate between two periods. The first period was 
one of strong external actor involvement that created the women’s police stations and 
improved implementation vs. the more recent period with intermittent external actor 
involvement, WPS closures, and implementation setbacks in the midst of national crisis. 
Training: In the early period of the women’s police stations, international cooperation 
agencies provided most funding for training, which was conducted by local women’s 
movement organizations and consultants who sometimes had a relationship with the women’s 
movement. The involvement of women’s civil society organizations in settings such as 
Nicaragua and Liberia can help build trust between the community and the police, in addition 
to bringing expertise to training (Bastick et al. 2007). In the 1990s, the police academy began 
to teach about gender values and VAW, followed by courses on gender and citizen security in 
the late 1990s (Bastick et al. 2007).  
The WPSs also hired women’s organizations to conduct courses on gender and VAW. 
During this first period, there was formal coordination between the women’s movement and 
the police that ended with the completion of the comprehensive donor-led training in 2004. 
Since 2004, international donors have remained involved in training, but on a more ad hoc 
basis. Training on gender and VAW is provided not only for women’s police station officers, 
but as a part of general police academy training as well. Police and international donors also 
conduct campaigns to raise consciousness of gender violence among citizens. This training 
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has promoted gender consciousness among police officers and campaigns have reportedly 
increased reporting by victims, as discussed by one police officer:  
The police force in general is being trained to provide greater gender 
consciousness…When women come to the women’s police stations it is because she 
has experienced a lot of violence. We are here so that she can break the silence, as the 
campaign says, and so that women can report it. After the “break the silence” 
campaign, there were many more reports then before.11 
 
Since the closing of the women’s police stations, it is reported that individuals 
without proper training working in the Judicial Assistance Directorate of the National Police 
are now addressing cases, in addition to Family Cabinet members outside the police.  
Institutional and Policy Restructuring: When women’s police stations were established in 
1993, Nicaraguan policing protocols were modified in tandem with the change to the 
institutional structure so that the women’s police stations aimed to protect women in 
particular. There were no embedded officers like the UN officers in Liberia conducting 
internal training and/or monitoring. However, external actors were embedded in the WPS by 
design, and these included civilians that were social workers, psychologists, and sometimes 
lawyers who helped provide a comprehensive set of services within the WPS for victims. The 
WPS worked in partnership with civil society organizations to provide women with services 
(Bastick et al. 2007), including psychological and forensic services. These institutional 
reforms included the creation of an integrated model of attention for women, and resulted in 
improved treatment of women victims. An individual working in the women’s police station 
describes the procedures in place for officers and other workers in the stations: 
We work on all of this from a gender-based perspective with the backing of legal 
frameworks [interviewee names the applicable laws and international norms]. We 
work in coordination with different sectors in an interdisciplinary and inter-
institutional manner. We work through a model of integral attention, where you have 
medical staff, forensic staff, legal assistance, psychological attention, social work, 
forensic attention, and police investigation.12 
 
                                                     
11 Anonymous interview by author. Managua, Nicaragua. March 11, 2008.  
12 Anonymous interview by author. Managua, Nicaragua. July 26, 2006. 
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Although the intervention of transnational advocacy network focusing on the issue of 
VAW has been necessary in order to compensate for a lack of state services, the networking 
itself made it possible to improve police performance for women. 
With the post-2008 weakening and then closing of the women’s police stations, this 
model of integral attention that was a significant advance in the provision of services for 
victims was dismantled and replaced with a more circuitous route for victims seeking 
assistance. In 2014, the Ortega administration issued a regulation that modified the 2012 
VAW law (Law 779) so that female victims with less severe cases are obligated to report to 
the Sandinista political party-affiliated Family Councils before reporting to the police.13 If 
they do advance to the police, victims are routed to the Judicial Assistance Directorate of the 
National Police – a non-specialized policing unit that lacks gender training. Marellyn 
Somarriba, women’s advocate, notes that these new authorities tell women reporting violence 
that “family is important. ‘Who is going to take care of your children?’ they ask” and thus 
discourage victims from pursuing cases (Córdoba 2018).  
Monitoring: In Nicaragua, monitoring does not take place directly from external actors. 
Rather, its signing on of regional and international human rights conventions obligates the 
state to periodically report its justice system progress toward compliance with these women’s 
rights standards. For example, Nicaragua is required to report to the United Nations on its 
compliance with the Convention on the Elimination on all Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW). It also reports to the Organization of American States on its compliance 
with the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of 
Violence against Women (Convention of Belém do Pará). While official reports are 
submitted by the state, women's organizations often submit "shadow reports" highlighting 
implementation gaps that may otherwise go unreported and the UN, and the UN and OAS 
                                                     
13 Anonymous interview by author. Managua, Nicaragua. August 12, 2014.  
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produce country-specific recommendations for improvements. In addition, the police had 
internal monitoring and accountability mechanisms, e.g., officers from the central office 
would resolve any issues that were reported in field offices. 
The recent and stark shift in the political environment reduced the influence of 
international donors in Nicaragua – and consequently undermined the potentially positive 
impacts of monitoring on women’s policing. Since 2007, many international donors have 
withdrawn from Nicaragua and the Ortega government has become increasingly 
consolidated. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the government was invested in Nicaragua’s 
international image as a women-friendly country, and its adoption of policies on VAW was a 
means of demonstrating this commitment. However, the more recent Ortega government has 
become increasingly immune to external influence through increasing centralization.  
Internationally-based monitoring has limited utility if the government does not value 
accountability to the international community. When this is compromised, countries are left 
with accountability to citizens (which depends on a well-functioning democracy) and to local 
NGOs (which depends on relationships of accountability with NGOs), and both of these have 
been increasingly strained with the Ortega government. Thus, the government has been 
increasingly unresponsive to external recommendations at the same time that external donor 
support and involvement has declined. 
Street-Level Performance: Even though police have been limited in terms of local capacity 
(sometimes, for example, not having a car or gasoline available for patrols), the women’s 
police stations made police much more responsive to women’s need for protection and 
intervention. Prior to the WPSs, the regular police often dissuaded women from pressing 
charges, either ignoring their complaints or even making them feel guilty about the violence 
perpetrated against them (Jubb et al. 2008, 30). Police officers were also known to turn 
victims away or instruct them to change their behavior in order to avoid violence (Walsh 
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2016a). The women’s policing units that were created in reaction to this situation were a vast 
improvement over the status quo, even though they are problematic in many ways. A survey 
in the year 2000 revealed that the majority of women police officers were “respectful and 
attentive to the public, and they dealt well with people and were well prepared to resolve 
problems” (Bastick 2007, 151). Official statistics on referral rates are not available for 
Nicaragua. However, there was a sharp increase in reporting that indicates an increase in trust 
in the state among victims as well as more widespread availability of police services after the 
creation of the women’s police stations (Ellsberg et al. 1997).  
International actors, particularly international cooperation agencies based in Europe, 
have had an impact on street-level responses to domestic violence in Nicaragua. However, 
these international actors could not have done so (or been successful in their efforts) without 
coordinating with local women’s organizations on the ground. For example, the women’s 
movement, with the financial support of several international donors, constructed several 
women’s clinics, including the IXCHEN Women’s Center, ANFAM, and SIMujer. These 
Centers have performed auxiliary and essential services for victims, such as providing 
psychological services or post-rape examinations and health care. Prior to the creation of 
women’s police stations, the problems in police responsiveness was similar to the ones in 
Liberia – victims were not taken seriously, were sent home to “make up” with their 
aggressors, in fact further disempowering women within abusive situations. These changes in 
Nicaragua made significant improvements for more gender sensitive street-level police 
performance.  
However, the new political environment in which domestic external actors have been 
excluded, and international external actors have increasingly withdrawn, has already initiated 
setbacks in street-level police performance for women. The closing of women’s police 
stations means increasing reliance on male officers who have not had the more extensive 
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specialized training of officers in women’s policing units. Marellyn Somarriba, Nicaraguan 
women’s advocate, reported that the Directorate of Judicial Assistance of the National Police 
now seeing cases “do not have gender violence training, the victim is blamed, and the 
investigative processes are extended.” (quoted in Córdoba 2018). Somarriba notes ways that 
the police are now returning to ways of discouraging women from following through on 
cases.She has observed that authorities ask women if they are sure they want to follow 
through with the reporting process involving a psychological evaluation that many women 
are hesitant to have conducted. Instead of women getting support from integral services that 
were formerly provided by the police, Somarriba reports that abusers “can have a network of 
support and part of this support is in the Family Cabinets” (Córdoba 2018). Thus, it appears 
that the very institution that should be the first line of defense for women facing abuse is 
being used to support their abusers. These stark examples of failures to protect female victims 
demonstrate that implementation is not linear. Implementation advances are vulnerable to 
setbacks and even reversals when the domestic political environment and/or international 
support wanes.  
Conclusion 
This comparative study of Liberia and Nicaragua shows two pathways through which 
external actors impact street-level implementation and the strategies they use. The case of 
Liberia is an example of an internationally-led and domestically-supported transnational 
implementation process. Conversely, the case of Nicaragua exemplifies a transnational 
implementation process that was domestically-led and internationally-supported. In Liberia, 
the UN collaborated with the government to create the WACPS, funded the construction of 
units across the country, and led the training of the section’s officers. It also contributed to 
shaping the institution’s structure and policies and to monitoring police performance. This 
suggests an internationally driven reform process. However, a deeper analysis of the political 
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context shows that there was also a strong women’s movement pressuring the government to 
act. Organizations within the movement also participated in training and monitoring police 
officers and in structuring the WACPS’ policies. The political environment in Liberia also 
facilitated the involvement of external actors (Medie 2013). Fourteen years of civil war had 
destroyed formal institutions, including the police force, and caused most personnel to flee. 
In the case of the police, its officers had been implicated in perpetrating atrocities against the 
civilian population. Thus, it lacked the capacity to perform basic functions during that initial 
post-war period. Therefore, the transitional government as well as the government of 
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf had to work closely with the UN and women’s organizations 
in implementing the country’s domestic violence policies. These internationally-led and 
domestically-supported initiatives resulted in improved street-level performance.  
In Nicaragua, the women’s movement was in a strong position to take the lead with 
advocating for reforming police performance vis-à-vis women, but lacked the resources to do 
so. While there were pockets of support within the government to engage in gender-sensitive 
police reform, this support was not uniform. Local actors, external to the state, initiated 
reforms in close coordination with (almost exclusively) women allies within the state who 
cared about the issue. Domestic women advocates worked with international cooperation 
agencies, who made funding available for specialized women’s police stations. International 
donors continued their support through involvement with further implementation efforts to 
advance training, changing institutional rules, and monitoring, which resulted in reduced re-
victimization of victims seeking police services. Preceding the closure of the women’s police 
stations, the opposite conditions held: disappearance of state support, exclusion of domestic 
civil society from the policy-making and implementation process, and the departure of 
international donors. Following the closures, initial reports demonstrate deteriorating street-
level policing performance.  
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 This paper makes an important contribution to the gender and politics and 
international relations literatures by showing that external actors can be crucial for policy 
implementation. It advances the literature on international norms, international organizations, 
and social movements by identifying the influence that international organizations and 
women’s movement organizations have on the implementation of international human rights 
norms at the street-level. In both countries, we demonstrate that women’s organizations in 
collaboration with the government and international organizations influenced street-level 
implementation. However, due to its role in creating the WACPS and in post-war 
reconstruction, the UN played a more prominent role in shaping street-level implementation 
in Liberia. This comparison demonstrates that both the levels of international and domestic 
involvement can vary within the implementation process and thus builds on the literature by 
identifying patterns of transnational implementation. It also illustrates that states are not 
always actors who resist international pressure or are reluctant to implement international 
norms. Thus, while states block implementation in some settings, they support 
implementation in others. Our cases show that the political context and external pressure and 
support were important in this regard.    
 Implementation is a challenge in many countries in Africa and Latin America; states 
are often unable or unwilling to implement policies. This unwillingness is particularly acute 
in the implementation of women’s rights laws and policies because this is an area that is not 
seen as a priority in most countries. Gender norms have shaped this perception. They have 
also shaped formal and informal institutions. Indeed, in most African countries, women’s 
ministries are underfunded, underscoring the need for external intervention in this area. This 
article has shown how external actors have intervened in and affected implementation. While 
holding perpetrators of domestic violence accountable is important, it is only one of many 
measures that are needed. Furthermore, many women do not want their partners to be 
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prosecuted. However, by showing how external actors influence implementation in this area, 
we have identified strategies and pathways that could have relevance for understanding and 
improving the implementation of other components of domestic violence policies, and of 
other women’s rights policies.   
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1 The term ‘domestic violence’ refers to intimate partner violence against women.  
2 Montoya’s transnationally-driven reform framework for policy change describes a process through which local 
actors trying to advocate for legal reforms experience a blockage when these reforms are proposed to the state, 
and then call upon international actors to pressure the state. This is similar to Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) 
boomerang model. However, this does not neatly apply to policy implementation in Liberia and Nicaragua, where 
there was not a blockage caused by an overall lack of political will. The state, as a site of contestation, was not 
uniformly opposed to these institutional changes. Obstacles to police reform were more in the form of a lack of 
local resources or capacity, and one important role of international organizations in these two countries was to 
help fund women’s policing units, which helped to overcome this lack of local resources. In part, these differences 
represent what is distinctive about policy reforms vs. institutional reforms: policy reforms only require overall 
political will (or, at least, a lack of resistance), whereas institutional reforms require some political will, but also 
financial resources or capacity. While Montoya mentions a lack of local capacity as an obstacle to implementation, 
this local capacity is not as relevant in countries where international cooperation or international organizations 
can help overcome a lack of local resources by externally funding new policing institutions.  
3 Medie (2013) discusses how international and domestic actors influenced street-level implementation of the rape 
law using these and other strategies. 
4 In the WACPS’ records, “domestic violence” was not limited to intimate partner violence but included all 
forms of violence within the home. Officers however explained that the majority of these cases were of intimate 
partner violence.  
                                                     
